Since judgments arising from the Family Court are not routinely published, what we see in them isn’t necessarily representative of patterns within the Family Court as a whole. But they are one useful source of at least some information about how the QLR system is operating on the ground, and give us a sense of the sorts of issues and themes to look out for. In truth, it isn’t easy to identify another source of information about how its going (though some well targeted FOI requests might assist).

I searched TNA Caselaw archive for judgments in the Family Court, Family Division or Court of Appeal (Civil Division) containing the keyword ‘QLR’. There were 35 matching judgments published in 2025 or 2026 (to date), spanning 34 cases (in one case there was a fact finding judgment and a welfare judgment – I treat those together). I have made a table of those judgments at the end of this post.

26 of the cases were about children and 8 were financial remedy or divorce cases. The judgments were a mixture of fact finding and final hearings, and a couple of preliminary hearings to deal with intervenors and third party assets / debt issues in financial remedy cases. They were at all tiers from DJ/ DDJ to CJ / Recorder up to DHCJ / High Court. The QLRs when appointed were sometimes for the mother/ wife and sometimes for the father / husband, occasionally both.

Cases where QLRs attended and asked questions

There were 9 cases where a QLR attended and actually asked questions (1, 2, 4 – two QLRs, 6, 9, 18, 22, 24, 25, 29, 31, 32). Where a QLR did attend, the questioning undertaken was (as would be expected) mostly of the other parent / spouse. In a few cases there was questioning of other witnesses or broader tasks undertaken: in case 1 the QLR seems to have made submissions and cross examined the Cafcass Officer, but it is unclear why that was necessary or appropriate. In case 4 the judgment refers to the QLR ‘submitting’ things on the mother’s ‘instructions’, and in case 7, the QLR didn’t ask any questions because the mother disengaged and withdrew, and the QLR is recorded as passing a note from her to the court, to the effect that the mother was ‘disinstructing my QLR’ and explicitly consented to the QLR not asking questions. In case 22 the Mother’s partner was questioned by the QLR (which seems appropriate since it was said the two had had a fight.

There is little explicit discussion of the QLR’s role or the limitations of it except in judgments 20 (where the judge asked questions in lieu of a QLR, considered it to have been fair and noted that the mother ‘says that she should have a QLR because the father has been represented and she is a Litigant in person: that is to fundamentally misunderstand the role of a QLR, which is to ask questions on behalf of someone who is prohibited from doing so’), and 34 where it appears the Father had had the benefit of a QLR at the earlier fact finding hearing, but did not need one at the final hearing (where the mother did not need to give evidence) and there the judge noted:

…it is problematic in our system that the mother has legal aid to fight her case in these proceedings and he does not. That creates a challenge for the court in trying to maintain fairness. This court has bent over backwards to try to ensure fairness, by appointing a QLR, allowing a MacKenzie friend, and giving clear instructions and explanations of what was required (for example setting them out in recitals to orders), allowing the father to make his submissions second, and so on. However it is difficult for a litigant in person and I acknowledge that. I am not sure, however that the outcome would have been different, given the evidence that was before the court

In only one case does a judge explicitly refer to the guidance which says that a judge asking questions does not count as ‘a satisfactory alternative’ to direct questioning, before going on to self-refer to the President’s 2024 judgment in Re Z (Prohibition on Cross-examination: No QLR) [2024] EWFC 22.

Cases where QLR did not appear

However, there were 12 cases where a QLR was directed but not available or not present, sometimes more than one QLR in the same case, and sometimes this occurred more than once in the same case. Three of those non-attendances or failed attempts were due to ill health or technical issues with the QLR that couldn’t obviously have been avoided (Eg 19). The rest were a mixture of the court being unable to find a QLR, unexplained non-appointment or unanticipated non-attendance – a number of cases involved a judge saying they had not been able to get to the bottom of why no QLR had attended as expected. In one case (15) a fact finding hearing was listed and adjourned twice, causing a delay of just under a year before the third attempt at a FFH was successful, leading to findings being made against the Father after the Mother had been questioned on his behalf by a QLR. That third attempt had only been able to proceed due to the diligence of the QLR who, having received the bundle only the day before the hearing, had worked all through her weekend to ensure she was ready on time. She was specifically praised for her hard work. The court doesn’t make clear who was supposed to send her the bundle, but I would guess that silence probably means it was a case of court error.

In one case (20) a mother had specifically applied for a QLR, but her application had simply not been actioned by the court, and was never put before a judge. In the end the hearing was able to proceed consensually, and in fact the judge concluded that whilst both parties considered themselves to be the victim of domestic abuse in the form of coercive and controlling behaviour from the other, on an objective view that was not the case.

In case 24 two QLRs were required. On the first attempt only one could be found, and was allocated to the husband, who subsequently went on to instruct solicitors, meaning that QLR was stood down – leaving the wife with no QLR. On the second attempt the court directed the attendance of a QLR for the wife, resulting in two QLRs attending! The husband’s QLR was discharged on arrival (presumably therefore rightly able to claim the fee for preparation and attendance, but a waste of resources nonetheless). Even on that second attempt things did not go smoothly as the QLR had only been provided with 44 pages of a large volume of papers (again, this is almost certainly a court issue), meaning the QLR needed to be given time to get up to speed before the hearing could start. In one case (28) the parties were ineligible for a QLR because the proceedings were issued prior to the commencement date of the relevant provisions (July 22). 2 QLRs were also sought but not obtained in case 30. (Other cases in which a QLR couldn’t be found, wasn’t appointed or didn’t show up were 8, 10, 11, 12, 21 33)

Difficulties with the QLR not being provided with the requisite information in advance were evident in a number of cases (in case 10 this was apparently down to the Mother’s solicitor, in case 15 (as above) the last minute provision of the bundle could have caused an adjournment, and quite possibly would have if there had not been a weekend intervening to allow the QLR to prepare in time for the following working day.

Cases where judges asked questions on behalf of a prohibited party

There were 10 cases in which the judge asked questions (3, 8, 9, 11, 14, 16, 19, 20, 28, 30) – judicial questioning was MORE FREQUENT than the questioning by QLRs which was supposed to have replaced such a practice. On one occasion the court directed the provision of written questions for the judge to ask at trial without bothering to try and obtain a QLR first (3). In case 16, where the judge asked questions for a father, the judgment sets out an apparently particularly acute difficulty with getting QLRs at all in the Newcastle area. It goes so far as to record that as a result, judges in Newcastle apparently don’t bother listing Ground Rules Hearings (which are mandatory under the FPR) because if there isn’t a QLR they serve no useful purpose and just waste resources. I have to say, that is not my view – the purpose of a ground rules hearing is far broader than simply to address QLR issues. And if there is unlikely to be assistance from a QLR then a ground rules hearing may be even more critical. The same judgment also records the judge’s particular concern about the difficulty of a judge asking questions (as did the judge in case 34).

I carefully reviewed the questions supplied by the parties. Many of the questions were irrelevant, some of them required reframing and many were related to welfare aspects of the case rather than the fact finding exercise that I had to undertake. I have to record that I found the task of asking questions of the mother and father both onerous, unnatural and difficult. Trying to draw the line between putting a party’s case fairly and straying into what might be regarded as inappropriate cross-examination by the judge is difficult. Given that fact-finds are inquisitorial in nature makes the job harder. On a practical level it is also extremely difficult to ask questions, take an accurate note of a witness’ evidence and assess the quality of their evidence. Nonetheless the child’s welfare requires us to persevere with this sub-optimal process. [my emphasis in bold]

Other solutions

In one case without a QLR (20) the court permitted the mother’s McKenzie friend to step into the breach and asked questions (this is the case where the court had failed to refer the mother’s application to a judge). In one other case the vulnerable intervenor against whom findings had been sought was discharged as an intervenor, so the need for questions to be asked on his behalf fell away – but it is difficult to see how fairness could have been achieved in that case if he had been required to participate in the fact finding hearing.

Wasted resources

Quite apart from cases where lawyers were assembled and judges and court staff scrambled for hearings that then had to adjourn as a result of a problem with a QLR (or lack of one), and near misses where a QLR was not equipped with the necessary papers, there were other cases which seemed to illustrate potential wasted resource. For instance, there were two cases where a QLR attended but the parent they were asking questions for disengaged (5 and 7). In case 7, mentioned above, where the mother disengaged with her QLR, the father’s QLR was directed to attend on day two in the hope the mother would attend for questioning but she did not so he was sent away. In several cases a prohibited party instructed their own solicitor after a direction for QLR appointment had been made (17, 23, 27). It did not always seem to be the case that the court had stood down the QLR in advance – either because they weren’t notified or didn’t act on a notification. Obviously, where a QLR has prepped and attended they should be paid for their work, and there were a couple of cases where I wasn’t sure if a QLR had done prep and been stood down before the hearing, which probably means they worked for free as they could not claim a fee for prep alone.

In case 13, a case heard by the President when a solicitor acting as a QLR for a father was subsequently instructed as his criminal solicitor – the mother objected to that. The President discharged him as a QLR, whereupon the father instructed the solicitor in the family proceedings, and he went on record as acting. This might suggest that the father was taking advantage of a ‘free lawyer’ while he could, even though he was in fact able to pay, but it isn’t the only explanation – he may have felt he had no option and have borrowed the money which he could not really afford. Or he may have belatedly realised the big difference between a QLR appointed by the court and a lawyer instructed by him). There are a couple of cases where, for whatever reason, after the imposition of a QLR on a party, they do go on to instruct a lawyer, and it is obviously really important that where they do the message that the QLR is no longer needed is effectively communicated to the court, and by the court to the QLR.

What my review of these judgments also evidences is the (legal and factual) complexity and gravity of some of the cases involving QLRs and litigants in person, and the vulnerability of multiple participants. Additionally, the communication breakdowns and difficulties coordinating the appointment of QLRs occur in combination with quite high levels of chaos on other fronts – whether through litigant behaviour, poor preparation by lawyers, non compliance with case management directions, difficulties with bundles or the health and wellbeing of participants and emerging appreciation of higher levels of vulnerability than had initially been understood. There are often issues with language and interpretation.

It wasn’t possible in these judgments to gain a sense of the nature or complexity of the questioning undertaken as it isn’t usually described. There are a couple of commendations of QLRs for their assistance and skillful questioning and adherence to the ground rules, but no further detail. The sample is probably too small to take much from it, particularly since the QLR is not always named, but with one exception the same QLR name does not appear twice. At least some of the QLRs are counsel, but it isn’t possible to match all the names with a particular online presence. There were also pro bono counsel acting on behalf of the vulnerable party in a number of cases, and a number of cases where direct access counsel were instructed at some point. Some of the cases involving a QLR or a QLR direction involved a third represented party (a child through their guardian or an intervenor) who was able to cross examine the witness in accordance with their instructions, but there was no suggestion in any judgment that this was thought to be a substitute for cross examination on behalf of the prohibited party, or that this advocate should ask the prohibited party’s questions instead of the judge (as used to sometimes happen).

Any conclusions?

As I said at the outset, there is a limit to what one can take from a sample of the 35 judgments that judges have (for whatever reason) decided to publish. They may or may not be representative. However, it is pretty striking that several years into the statutory prohibition on direct questioning, it seems still to be the case that judges are left to ask questions themselves more often than they are assisted by a QLR.

It doesn’t appear from this sample as if the problem of insufficient numbers of QLRs (which the President attempted to tackle in his 2024 judgment) has yet been resolved, even by the increase in rates implemented last year. There is some support for the notion of ‘QLR deserts’.

My own anecdotal information suggests that the inconsistency in approach to what a QLR can and cannot / should and should not be doing / asked to do is a bigger issue than appears from this sample. I am hearing frequently of cases where QLRs either try to overstep their role, or are expected to do so by judges. I anticipate we’ll see more judgments grappling with this filtering through in due course – or perhaps that the practice will begin to align more closely with the limited role described in the statutory guidance and the President’s judgment in K v P (Criminal Solicitor as Court-Appointed QLR)
[2025] EWFC 321 (case 13).

Whether we like it or not, neither the purpose nor effect of the scheme is to act as an equivalent to proper representation by a party, and if the scheme works as intended it will not provide a litigant in person with either advice or full representation. In one case (17) the judge records explaining ‘DARVO’ to the Father, along with the role of a solicitor ‘so that as a litigant in person he might avoid unwittingly assisting the case against him by virtue of his own pleadings’. Her warnings were to come to pass, even though he instructed direct access counsel to represent him very shortly before the hearing, by then he had filed a schedule of allegations against the mother and 17 statements, many of which had been prepared with the assistance of Chat GPT, leading the judge to say that ‘It is difficult to distinguish between what F says and what an algorithm tells F to say’. The court dismissed all his allegations against the mother and made findings against him, saying that

It is clear from the totality of the evidence that F has been abusive, controlling and coercive of M. He has continued that abuse through his evidence, submissions and the manner in which he has instructed his case to be run. His communications show frequent and often unjustified criticism of M and these were expanded upon in no uncertain terms by F and his witnesses. Even when M’s actions were in B’s best interests, she was not spared from question and criticism.

The judge concluded specifically that ‘F’s schedule, and indeed his case itself, amounts to DARVO. ‘ and that ‘I also consider F’s litigation conduct to be a continuation of controlling and coercive behaviour and abusive behaviour.’ Whether the father might have moderated his behaviour if he had the benefit of earlier legal advice (paid for by himself or legal aid) is impossible to know. But perhaps the mother might have been spared at least some of the further abuse perpetrated by him through the proceedings if he had…

A Post-Script – Naming conventions – a bugbear

Another important message to come out of my nerdy little survey is confirmation of my suspicions: 10 of the 26 children cases use the unimaginative ciphers ‘M’ and ‘F’ or ‘Mother’ and ‘Father’ (and a further case involving same sex parents used M1 and M2). 42% of children judgments use a naming system which renders the judgment practically indistinguishable from almost half of the other judgments published. So if, like me, you had the creeping sense that almost every flipping judgment published these days is called M v F or F v M, and if you spend your time trying to work out which M v F is being referred to – no, you are not imagining it. Even if pseudonyms is too much work, is it too much to ask for judges to give cases letters which aren’t M or F and which don’t match their actual initials? Or better still, to include a descriptive summary in parentheses: A v B (the one with the really helpful quote in) [2026] EWFC xxxx (Fam).

The cases I’m referring to

Here are the 35 judgments and citations. I’m afraid I failed to keep the URLs in a handy location and I don’t have the inclination to go and find them to hyperlink them individually, but if you cut and paste the case name and citation into the search box at TNA (here) you will get there in a click or two.